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The Supreme Court Fails to Correct Past Mistakes by Hiding Behind Super Powered Stare
Decisis
by Brendan Johnson*1
Part I: Introduction
In Brulotte v. Thys Co., the United States Supreme Court held that contracts that attempt
to extend royalty agreements past the expiration of a patent are per se unenforceable.2 The Court
reasoned that patent owners already had a great deal of bargaining power with their limited
monopoly on the product and found that extending royalties would extend that monopoly.3 This
ruling has been criticized as being contrary to basic ideals of contract law.4 Further, this ruling
was not interpretation of existing patent law, but instead was entirely judge made law.5 The
ruling in Brulotte was recently challenged by Stephen Kimble, the inventor of a popular “Web
Blaster Toy,” who entered into a royalty agreement with Marvel for three percent of the net
product sales of his toy with no end date.6
The case made its way to the Supreme Court challenging what the Ninth Circuit called
“the Supreme Court's frequently-criticized decision in Brulotte.”7 The Supreme Court upheld the
ruling in Brulotte, stating that, “respecting stare decisis means sticking to some wrong

* Thank you to Professor Caraballo for advising me on this note.
2
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
3
Id.
4
IPO Urges End to 50-Year-Old Rule Automatically Nullifying All Agreements To Pay Royalties After Expiration
Of A Patent, IPO DAILY NEWS, https://www.ipo.org/index.php/daily_news/february-6-2015/.
5
Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (Brulotte was thus a bald act of
policymaking. It was not simply a case of incorrect statutory interpretation. It was not really statutory interpretation
at all).
6
Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1158 (D. Ariz. 2010).
7
Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 2013).
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decisions.”8 To support its ruling, the Supreme Court relied on Hallibutron Co. v. Erica P. John
Fund Inc., and Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.9
The Court held that overturning stare decisis, especially when Congress can correct the
mistakes, requires more than just a belief that the ruling was wrong.10 This note will argue that
the majority in the Supreme Court ruled incorrectly and did not properly consider the economic
and social realities of its decision. Part II will discuss the background information to Kimble v.
Marvel Enterprises and the Courts rationale for that decision. Part II will also give a brief
overview of anti-trust and parent law. Part III will analyze why the decision in Kimble was
incorrect and discuss some possible alternative decision the Court could have reached.
Additional Part II will break down the cases and arguments used by both the majority and the
dissent in Kimble.
Part II: Background and Changes leading up to Kimble
This section will discuss background of Brulotte and the Courts rationale for that
decision. It will also briefly look at the evolution of patent and anti-trust law and the criticism of
the Brulotte decision. Finally, this section will give a breakdown of Kimble as it went through
the various courts giving the pertinent facts. There has been a large amount of criticism
surrounding the decision in Buroltte the Seventh Circuit stated, in Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc.,
that the Supreme Court’s reasoning was dubious and that it showed the Court was out of touch

8

Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015).
Id. (citing Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2406 (2014), Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2369 (1989)).
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with reality.11 The Seventh Circuit in Scheiber also stated that if they had the power to that they
would overrule the Supreme Court’s decision.12
A. Summary of Brulotte
Brulotte involved an agreement between the owner of patents for a hop-picking machine
and two farmers who purchased the machines for a flat sum and a yearly royalty agreement.13
The royalty agreement did not state an end date and the farmers, after several years, refused to
make any further royalty payments.14
The trial court and the Supreme Court of Washington held for the owner of the patent and
the US Supreme Court reversed.15 The Court held that to allow a royalty to extend past the
expiration of patent would go against the purpose of the Patent Act, although nothing in the
Patent Act mentions royalty agreements.16 The Court reasoned that the restrictions on royalties
were necessary in the prevention of unjust patent monopolies.17 The Court’s reasoning was that
after the expiration date of a patent the product should be freely available to all who chose to use
it and continued royalty agreements would lead to an unjust monopoly.18
The Court also found that having a patent already grants the owner with substantial
leverage in negotiations and that allowing the owner to use that leverage to extend royalty
agreements would give patent owners unfair bargaining power.19
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Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 30.
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Id.
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Id. (citing 35 USCS § 154).
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Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
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Id. at 33.
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B. Court Interpretation of Anti-Trust Law
Anti-trust law originally had a per se rule similar to the Court’s current interpretation of
patent law.20 The Court had strict interpretation that all vertical monopolies constituted a restraint
on trade.21 The Supreme Court, however, has held for many years that Congress only intended
to outlaw restraints on trade that were unreasonable.22 Most anti-trust cases are considered on a
case-by-case basis employing a rule of reason that looks at the specific information presented in
each case.23 The reasoning behind this case-by-case analysis was based upon on the complicated
and situational nature of whether or not an activity is actually restricting competition or creating
a monopoly.24
Similarly to the Court’s interpretation of anti-trust law, patent law is judge made law
going beyond the terms found in the statute.25 This has led many to advocate for a case-by-case
analysis of whether a royalty agreement should be allowed to continue past the expiration of a
patent.26 The International Patent Owners Association also endorsed the use of the rule of reason
after evaluating more than one hundred years of anti-trust and patent misuse law.27
C. Summary of Kimble
On May 23, 2008, Marvel informed Kimble that he was not entitled to certain extra value
royalties and that Marvel had overpaid him by $282,700 in 2007.28 Kimble originally brought
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United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 558 (1898).
Id.
22
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2417 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
26
Scott Doyle, Brulotte Rule Upheld Despite Suspect Economic Rationale,
http://www.law360.com/articles/670682/brulotte-rule-upheld-despite-suspect-economic-rationale
21

27

IPO Urges End to 50-Year-Old Ruling Automatically Nullifying all to Pay Royalties After the Expiration of a
Patent, IPO DAILY NEWS, https://www.ipo.org/index.php/daily_news/february-6-2015/.
28
Kimble, 692 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
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the breach of contract claim before a state court.29 The claim was later removed to federal court
through diversity jurisdiction.30 During this initial litigation, Marvel discovered the Brulotte
decision and informed Kimble that they would no longer pay for royalties for his invention after
the expiration of his patent.31 The district court held that the agreement was per se
unenforceable, as per the law the Supreme Court had laid down in Brulotte, and Kimble
appealed.32 Despite the fact that Kimble and Marvel had intentionally bargained for the extended
agreement it was found void without the district court being able to make any inquiry into the
fairness of the agreement.
The Ninth Circuit heard the case and also held for the agreement to unenforceable but
stated:
We have previously noted that Brulotte has been read to require that
any contract requiring royalty payments for an invention either after
a patent expires or when it fails to issue cannot be upheld unless the
contract provides a discount from the alternative, patent-protected
rate. We acknowledged that the Brulotte rule is counterintuitive
and its rationale is arguably unconvincing. Nonetheless,
recognizing that we are bound by Supreme Court authority and the
strong interest in maintaining national uniformity on patent law
issues, we have reluctantly applied the rule.33
The Supreme Court decided the case on June 22, 2015 and upheld the rule in Brulotte.34
The Court reasoned that although the ruling would inhibit some parties from entering into arm’s
length deals that both parties desired, there were ways to achieve similar enough ends using
different means.35

29

Id.
Id.
31
Id.
32
Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1158 (D. Ariz. 2010).
33
Id.; Zila, Inc. v. Tinnell, 502 F.3d 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
34
Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015).
35
Id.
30
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The court relied heavily on the reasoning that overturning the decision was precluded by
stare decisis and that the Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions.36 The Court stated that to
overturn past decisions would create confusion and uncertainty.37 The Court also found that
even if Kimble is correct and the law should be changed because of serious economic error in the
Brulotte decision, that it was not the Court’s place to change it.38 The Court stated that Kimble
could take his grievances to Congress and that Congress has had ample time to change the law if
it felt Brulotte was incorrect. 39
i. Kimble dissent
The dissent contended that the Court was free to overrule the law in Brulotte because it
was judge made law to begin with.40 The dissent also stated that the holding in Brulotte was
based upon incorrect economic and policy justifications.41 The dissent continues that the
majority has downplayed the harm of its decision and that not only is counter to traditional
contract law, the holding will also serve to upset party’s expectations.42
Also pointed out is how difficult it is to get legislation passed through Congress and that
just because Congress has not addressed an issue does not mean that it supports the current
judicial law.43

36

Id.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015)
40
Id. at 2409.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 2404.
43
Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
37
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III. Analysis
A. The Court’s misplaced reliance on Stare Decisis
The Court in Kimble relied heavily on the notion that stare decisis preempted them from
overturning the decision in Brulotte by virtue of the fact that it had been decided.44 The Court
stated that it is difficult to override precedent and that adherence to previous decisions is the
foundation of the judicial system.45 The Court goes as far to say that even incorrect decisions
should be upheld in the name of reliability.46 The Court gives additional strength to stare decisis
when the Court opinion is interpreting a statute because of the possibility that if the Court was
incorrect Congress could rewrite the law.47
The common law traditions of the United States is undeniably important, as is the
necessity of consistent and reliable law. These concerns, however, are not great enough to
justify keeping antiquated law in place for consistencies sake. The holding in Brulotte is not
something that effects a large number of people and is the type of complicated issue that requires
close judicial interpretation. Overruling a judicially made law that has served to upset party’s
reasonable expectation would not decrease the consistency or reliability of the legal system; in
fact, it would increase it.
i. The Court’s ability to overturn past wrong decisions.
The Supreme Court articulated four factors in Planned Parenthood v. Casey to guide in
deciding when it is appropriate for to overturn a previous decision despite the concept of stare
decisis.48 The factors the court considered were: (1) whether the rule has become unworkable;

44

Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2411.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
45
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(2) if the rule is subject to a large degree of reliance that would create harm if it were overruled;
(3) if the ruling is now subject to abandoned doctrine; and (4) if the facts surrounding the ruling
have changed so that the justification for the original ruling is no longer relevant. 49
When looking at the facts present in Kimble it is clear that these factors weigh in favor of
abandoning the Court’s older ruling because of the lack of reliance on the rule, changes in facts
and similar rulings that have been abandoned.
The lack of reliance upon the rule is quite clear, especially when considering how
relatively unknown the ruling is.50 Marvel, a multibillion-dollar corporation with thousands of
copyrights that deals frequently with patents, was entirely unaware of the ruling at the outset of
its deal with Kimble.51 Marvel did not realize the rule existed until they stumbled upon it in their
first lawsuit against Kimble.52 The dissent pointed out that so few people and companies are
aware of this rule that in most cases it would actually serve to harm a party's reasonable reliance
on commonly understood contract law.53 The notion that an arm’s length agreement would be
voided regales of the position of the parties and legality of agreement is counter to the notion of
pacta sunt servanda.54 The small number of cases on this matter and the relatively small
number of people that it affects also shows a lack of reliance on the law. The fact that the cases
that have been brought regarding this judge made law have all involved matters where the parties
were unaware of the ruling and were not relying upon it is proof of the lack of reliance.55

49

Id.
Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015).
51
Id.; David Goldman, Disney to Buy Marvel for $4 Billion Dollars, CNN,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/08/31/news/companies/disney_marvel/.
52
Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 2013).
53
Id.
54
ARTICLE: From "Sanctity" to "Fairness": An Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts?, 18 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int'l
& Comp. L. 95
55
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2404; State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, pincite (1997); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
233 (2009); Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 260 (1991).
50
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The facts surrounding the rule have also greatly changed in regard to both patent law and
the nature of information in general. In 1963, there were only 90,982 patents filed in the United
States that number rose to 615,243 in 2014.56 The extreme increase in the number of patents
filed every year exemplifies the wider range of parties filing patents. This is drastic increase in
patents filed has been caused in part by modern technology, which has made it much easier to
file a patent. It is now possible to file patent without ever leaving home with the U.S Patent and
Trademark Office’s online resources.57
The case in Brulotte involved a patent owner taking advantage of unsophisticated and
disadvantaged farmers. 58 Today in cases involving large corporations, such as Marvel, the patent
owner is disadvantaged. The Court in Brulotte reasoned that if patent owners could continue to
reap a benefit from their patents that it may encourage them to keep their patents from becoming
public.59 Perhaps this was a concern during that time period, but today it would be impossible.
Anyone can go online and search through all registered patents even ones that have expired.60
The patents can even be search by keyword or by category, making it easy to specific patents. 61
The website even has a seven-step strategy to help new users find patents.62
The Brulotte ruling has become a relic of law that is no longer adhered to in any
significant extent, as exemplified in the Courts adornment of per se antitrust cases under the
Sherman Act. The Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., overruled

56

U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 163-2014,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.html.
57
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, File Online, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/file-online.
58
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
59
Id.
60
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Search for Patents, http://www.uspto.gov/patents-applicationprocess/search-patents.
61
Id.
62
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Seven Step Strategy, http://www.uspto.gov/learning-andresources/support-centers/patent-and-trademark-resource-centers-ptrc/resources/seven.
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previous precedent that held vertical price restraints were per se illegal under the Sherman Act.63
The Court replaced the per se rule with a rule of reason that looks at each individual case to
determine if the vertical price restraints are indeed anti-competitive.64 In the Court’s decision, it
reasoned that it is dangerous to rely on the economic understandings of the past, considering how
different today’s modern economy is than it was in the past.65 The Court did not accept the
argument that certain administrative advantages warrant the Court maintaining the per se
standard.66 The Court stated that there are demanding standards that must be meet to justify a
per se rule and that the possibility that there could be vertical price control and a complete lack
of anti-competitive behavior precluded the Court from finding that the standard had been met.67
The Kimble Court’s decision to keep the Brulotte rule in place is counter to the standards
articulated in Casey. The Court stated how difficult it would be to implement a rule of reason
and spoke of the challenge administrative challenges of changing past laws.68 At a certain point
administrative challenges should be a factor that influences the Court’s decisions, but that should
be reserved for situations in which the challenges are great. The greatest challenge of
implementing a rule of reason over a per se rule would be the requirement that the courts look
into each individual matter to determine if an anti-competitive action has taken place. At first
this might prove to be a slight challenge but case law would quickly develop and guide the
courts. Once a system for evaluating the cases on their merits was in place it would be quick and
easy to decide the cases and would lead to an equitable result. Additionally it would not be
difficult for a court to quickly determine whether the agreement is anti-competitive. A cursory

63

Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).
Id. at 887.
65
Id. at 888.
66
Id. at 895.
67
Id.
68
Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2411 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
64
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review of the contract and the relative bargaining positions of the two parties would reveal
almost any anti-competitive behavior.
The Court’s fears of disrupting the consistency of the legal system and administrative
challenges are misplaced and shortsighted. The greater value give to administrative efficiency
over judicial fairness is harmful to both the economy and our legal system in its entirety.
B. Distinguishing Cases Cited by the Majority
The majority overly relies on stare decisis to avoid facing their incorrect past decisions.69
The Justices in the majority place unfounded dependence upon past cases that deal with judicial
interpretation of statutes. As the dissent aptly states this is not simply a matter of judicial review
of the interpretation of a statute, this is judicial review of judge made law.70 In addition the
Court fails to take proper account of other factors that affect overturning past decisions, such as
changed conditions.71
One such case the majority cites for its stare decisis argument is Michigan v. Bay.72 This
case involved the state of Michigan suing a Native American tribe that was attempting to build a
casino on land that they had purchased outside of the reservation.73 The state claimed that the
casino would be in violation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.74 The Court held that the
tribe was immune from the suit because of tribal suit immunity, regardless of the fact that the
area in question was not on the reservation.75 The Court stated that it does not overturn
precedent lightly when it made its decision to uphold the rule.76 The Court however, goes on to

69

Id.
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2417 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
71
Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
72
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2411.
73
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2026 (2014).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 2038
76
Id.
70
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state how nothing has changed in since that last Supreme Court case regarding tribal immunity.77
The Court goes to great lengths to justify why the law should not be overturned going into
various policy justifications and showing how the original ruling was not only correct, but that
the circumstances surrounding the original interpretations are still just as valid.78
Michigan is easily distinguishable from Kimble because of the extensive and concrete
analysis that Michigan gives.79 The Court in Michigan goes to great length to explain why their
original interpretation of the law was the correct and that the circumstance that lead to their
previous decision had not substantially changed.80 In Kimble, the Court merely says it is unclear
if the original ruling was incorrect and that whether the circumstances behind the decision has
changed enough is unclear without any substantial analysis.81
Another case the majority relies on is Payne v. Tennesse.82 This case, which was has
been overruled on other grounds, involves a Defendant challenging the introduction of
statements made by the family members of murder victim that he claimed were overly
prejudicial.83 Although the Court speaks of the value of stare decisis, it also states that there is
not a strict formula to adhere to when deciding whether to overrule past decision.84 The Court
went on to state that when reviewing past decisions it is important to consider wide policy
implications.85 The Court decided to overrule the previous decisions, despite the previous
decision being of a class that is afforded additional adherence.86 The Court in Payne also stated

77

Id.

78

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S.Ct. 2024, 2026 (2014).

79

Id.
Id.
81
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2412.
82
Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 260 (1991).
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 2610.
86
Id. at 2610-11.
80
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“[c]onsiderations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in cases involving property and
contract rights, where reliance interests are involved.”87
Payne can be distinguished from the case at hand because as the dissent points out the
current rule of law is operating primarily to upset party’s reasonable expectations.88 In addition
to parties’ expectations, this case is distinguishable from Kimble because the Court in Payne
overruled the past holdings even after extoling the virtue of stare decisis.89
i. Cases Cited by the Dissent
The dissent cites the case Pearson v. Callahan to bolster their argument regarding the
majority’s over reliance on stare decisis.90 This case involved whether or not a police officer
was entitled to qualified immunity.91 The Court overturned the old categorical rule stating that it
would better adhere to party’s expectations and that the old rule was erroneous judge made law.92
The Court also stated that, “[r]evisiting precedent is particularly appropriate where, as here, a
departure would not upset expectations, the precedent consists of a judge-made rule . . . and
experience has pointed out the precedent’s shortcomings”.93 This speaks exactly to the case at
hand because Brulotte was judge made law.94 There is nothing in the Patent Act that mentions
royalties so the entire holding is judge made law.95
The Court in Kimble had the opportunity to address the shortcomings in the judge made
law that was erroneously created and instead decided to fall back on the stare decisis.96 This

87

Id.
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2417 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
89
Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 260 (1991).
90
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2417 (Alito, J., dissenting).
91
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009).
92
Id. (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)).
93
Id.
94
Brulotte at 177.
95
1 USCS § 1-376
96
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. at 2411.
88
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note does not argue that there is no strength behind stare decisis, but rather that it should not be
used to avoid fully delving into an issue of judge made law to reveal the shortcomings in past
precedent.
C. Judicial Interpretation of Patent Act compared to Antitrust Law
The Supreme Court has done away with per se findings in regards to vertical price fixing
in antitrust law.97 The primary motivations behind the Court overruling its past precedent in
regards to antitrust law were economic changes and upholding party’s reasonable expectations.98
The Court implemented a rule of reason, which is a case-by-case analysis that better
serves party’s expectations and notions of justice.99 The Court in Kimble should have created a
case-by-case analysis for cases where a royalty agreement continues after the expiration of
patent. Both the original price fixing analysis and the analysis in Brulotte was based upon fears
of monopolies that are no longer serious concerns.100
The case State Oil v. Khan involves an interpretation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act.101
The court of Appeals had found it was bound by previous rulings made by the Supreme Court
that a vertical maximum price fixing scheme was a per se anti-trust violation.102 Similar to the
lower court in Kimble, the lower court in State Oil did not agree with the ruling, but felt bound
by previous Supreme Court rulings.103
The Supreme Court overruled the past precedent and held that vertical maximum price
fixing scheme was not a per se anti-trust violation.104 The Court established a rule of reason that

97

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.; Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964).
101
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
102
Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1996).
103
Id.
104
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
98
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would address each matter on a case-by-case basis.105 The Court looked towards economic
justifications and found holding all forms of pricing fixing to be per se unenforceable would not
properly be addressing the issues at hand.106 When justifying the new rule of reason the Court
stated:
Although we do not lightly assume that the economic realities underlying
earlier decisions have changed, or that earlier judicial perceptions of those
realities were in error, we have noted that "different sorts of agreements" may
amount to restraints of trade "in varying times and circumstances," and "it would
make no sense to create out of the single term 'restraint of trade' a chronologically
schizoid statute, in which a 'rule of reason' evolves with new circumstances and
new wisdom, but a line of per se illegality remains where it was.107
State Oil is also relevant because of the stare decisis implications. The Court overturned
the precedent after going through a detailed analysis and determining that the rule of law that had
been established in Albrecht v. Herald Co., was wrong and was based upon an economic
situation that no longer existed.108
Plaintiff in Kimble asked the Court to adopt a similar reasoning stating that courts should
look into each individual matter to see if the patent owner is exerting unreasonable control on
their patent or is attempting to create or further a monopoly.109
The Court in State Oil relied on another case, Continental v. GTE Sylvani , which
overturned precedent of a per se rule that was not economically practical or and judicially
inflexible.110
In Continental v. GTE Sylvani the Court stated: “Since its announcement, Schwinn has
been the subject of continuing controversy and confusion, both in the scholarly journals and in

105

Id.
Id.
107
Id. (citing Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988)).
108
State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
109
Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2411 (2015).
106

110

State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 118 S.Ct. 275 (1997); Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
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the federal courts”.111 The majority of scholarly opinions have disagreed with the decision, and
many of the federal courts that have encountered vertical restrictions have attempted to limit its
reach.112 In the Court’s view, the experience that the judicial system had obtained in the 10 years
prior to that decision should be applied to the subject of because of its substantial commercial
importance.113 The Court went on to overrule the per se rule involving broad restrictions on
selling locations for products.114
The circumstances surrounding the decision in Continental are strikingly similar to the
circumstances the Court faced in Kimble.115 In both cases, federal courts and scholars alike
criticized the past decisions.116 Recent trends in economic development were also cited, showing
how the older decisions were out of touch with proper legal and economic ideals.117
The dissent in Kimble stated “[e]ven taking the Court on its own terms, Brulotte was an
antitrust decision masquerading as a patent case.”118 This type of case is so similar to an antitrust case that would be very reasonable for the Court to adopt a similar analysis.119 Adopting the
analysis would also create a greater degree of consistency in the law.
It would be practical for the Court to apply the same rule of reason standard to cases
involving a royalty agreement extending past the expiration of a patent that is applied to antitrust cases. The two are very similar because they both involve potential anti-competitive
activities, but have a productive and legitimate utility.

111

Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
Id.
113
Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
114
Id.
115
Kimble; Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
116
Kimble v. Marvel Enters., 727 F.3d 856, 857 (9th Cir. 2013); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Cont’l T. V., Inc., 537 F.2d
980, 993 (9th Cir. 1976).
117
Id.
118
Kimble, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2417 (2015) (Alito, T., dissenting).
119
Id.
112
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Applying the rule of reason of reason would be beneficially from an administrative and
judicial perspective. Having more case where judges apply the rule of reason would give the
judges the experience they need to make decisions that are equitable. Judges applying the rule of
reason in more situations will allow them to make their decisions faster and more efficiently
because of the case law developing more quickly as more cases are decided.
D. Parties should not be restricted from their freedom to Contract in non-adhesive or
immoral contracts
The notion that freedom to contract, within certain limitations, is of paramount
importance to the United States economy was clearly articulated in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States.120
This case deals with an oil corporation monopoly, but goes into an in depth analysis of
whether agreements that create a monopoly can be ever be enforceable.121 The case also
establishes that freedom to contract in situations where there are no moral or legal barriers is
essential.122 The Court referring the great importance of the freedom to contract stated:
[F]reedom of the individual right to contract when not unduly or
improperly exercised was the most efficient means for the
prevention of monopoly, since the operation of the centrifugal and
centripetal forces resulting from the right to freely contract was the
means by which monopoly would be inevitably prevented if no
extraneous or sovereign power imposed it and no right to make
unlawful contracts having a monopolistic tendency were permitted.
In other words that freedom to contract was the essence of freedom
from undue restraint on the right to contract.123
The notion that freedom to contract, absent coercion or illicit content, should be protected
is not just a relic of the past but still something that is very relevant in American law.124
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Enforcing contracts as written in arm’s length agreements, where there is no oppression or
coercion is well established in the common law.125 There is nothing oppressive in the agreement
between Kimble and Marvel it was clearly an arm’s length transaction between two sophisticated
parties.126 If there were any party that would be suspected of having an unfair bargaining
position, it would be the multi-national corporation and not the individual inventor.
The Court in Quality Prods. & Concepts Co. exemplified another important facet of
contract law, that deals should not be unilaterally altered.127 The Court stated, “[h]owever, with
or without restrictive amendment clauses, the principle of freedom to contract does not permit a
party unilaterally to alter the original.”128 This ruling has essentially allowed Marvel to
unilaterally alter the original agreement in manor sanctioned by the Court.129 Marvel and
Kimble had reached a mutually beneficial where Marvel would spread out paying the royalties
for a lower rate over a longer period of time.130 After Marvel discovered Brulotte they used the
law to unilateral alter the contract in their favor.131 Now, the consideration Kimble gave for
lowering the royalty rate is worthless.
Contract law in the United States aims to promote free business and enforce both
reasonable expectations and general enforcement. A fairly formed contract should not be held to
be invalid without a strong justification. The mere fact that arms length agreement would enable
a royalty agreement to extend past the expiration of a patent is not a substantial enough
justification for the contract to be held invalid. If all the other elements of a fairly established
contract are present and no actual harm is shown to flow from the contract than the contract
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should be enforced. This consistent enforcement of properly formed contracts is of paramount
importance to the proper functioning of both our judicial system and the United States economy.
E. Parties should not have to contract around a complicated rule to make an agreement
The Court’s argument in Kimble, manifesting its desire to uphold Brulotte in order to
create predictable and stable law that will uphold party’s reasonable expectations, is not
persuasive because the rule is actually severing to upset party’s expectations. This is clear from
the very circumstances of the case where the parties were unaware of the law and it neither of the
parties expected that the agreement could be nullified. The Court stated:
The Brulotte rule, like others making contract provisions
unenforceable, prevents some parties from entering into deals they
desire. As compared to lump-sum fees, royalty plans both draw out
payments over time and tie those payments, in each month or year
covered, to a product’s commercial success. And sometimes, for
some parties, the longer the arrangement lasts, the better—not just
up to but beyond a patent term’s end. A more extended payment
period, coupled (as it presumably would be) with a lower rate, may
bring the price the patent holder seeks within the range of a cashstrapped licensee. (Anyone who has bought a product on installment
can relate) . . . yet parties can often find ways around Brulotte,
enabling them to achieve those same ends.132
The Court’s reasoning begs the question, that if the end result of the deal is acceptable,
then why must parties overcome unnecessary obstacles to achieve their desired results. The
Court admits the value of allowing the deal and how the consideration is reasonable and is
something that is potentially better for both parties.133 The danger in this decision lies with
uninformed parties. The Court is creating a complicated and unintuitive system for parties to
reach their desired ends. If two parties enter into a royalty agreement without being aware of this
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ruling, as were the parties in Kimble, there is a serious risk that their reasonable expectations will
be upset.
In addition to innocent mistakes between unaware parties, sophisticated businesses could
use this rule to harm small investors who have little legal knowledge. In the future, Marvel
could structure a deal for royalties for a long period of time and then refuse to continue payments
after the patent has expired. Since the current rule is a per se rule, the clause will be invalidated
without the harmed party having the opportunity to show why it should be enforced.134
The ruling that the Supreme Court articulated in Kimble could actually enable parties to
be more coercive. A clever party could work an extended royalty agreement into a contract with
the knowledge that once the patent had expired they would no longer be required to pay the
royalties. As the rule stands there would be no opportunity for a judge to review the formation
of the royalty agreement or for a judge to review the relative bargaining power of the two
parties.135 So, even if a large corporation is duplicitous and underhanded in forming a contract
with an inventor, the judge will be precluded from reaching an equitable result. This is
essentially allowing potential coercion to go unchecked.
F. Policy Reasons for overturning Brulotte
There are many public policy reasons in favor of contract enforcement and incentivizing
inventions. There is also no potential danger that a patent owner would be able to extend their
monopoly over the product because at the end of the day they would not have a patent, but a
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contract that allowing them royalties for the product.136 There is nothing keeping a third party
from profiting off the invention once the patent expires.
i. Party’s reasonable expectations
The dissent in Kimble makes clear that there is no reasonable risk that extending royalty
agreements could increase the likelihood of monopolies. 137
Parties would expect that a properly drafted contract would be enforced by the United
States government, baring any issues of illegality. Additionally, parties would expect to be able
to bring a complaint in court if a one of the parties has been coercive. A sophisticated party could
know the current per se law on royalties and intentionally make a very long royalty agreement
for a low percentage. That harmed party would not be able to bring this information into court to
make a case that the contract should be enforced.138 The per se rule is serving not only to upset a
party’s reasonable expectations, but is also allowing for more sophisticated parties to take
advantage of their counter parties without any real judicial review.
This cuts against the majority’s argument that they are adhering to previous
decisions to create more uniformity and predictability in the law. By upsetting party’s
reasonable expectations, the court is creating less predictability in the law.
ii. Incentivizing invention
The Intellectual Property Owners (“IPO”) urged the Supreme Court in their amicus brief
to end the outdated rule that automatically nullifies all contracts that pay royalties after the
expiration of a patent.139 The IPO stated that the “Brulotte rule undermines the basic integrity of
136
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contracts”.140 The IPO made that statement after reviewing more than 100 years of history of
antitrust and patent misuse law.141
Inventions are of vital importance to the advancement of culture and society. Inventions
are so integral to the advancement and success of our society that it is easy to forget inventions
lay the foundation to the modern world. From medical breakthroughs that have cured diseases
that plagued our ancestors to the information revolution that has connected our world like never
before, invention is the heart of it all. The Court has made a great error in so significantly
limiting incentives for invention.
If inventors are unable to make financially viable agreements, they may be discouraged
from the field that has laid down the bedrock to the modern world. Although inventors may
seem to gift us with the innovations that we require to continue our modern society they like
most others are motivated by economic gain. To take away the possibility of long term benefits
from a patent regardless of the circumstances is to take away the life blood of the inventor. The
rule of reason would enable the courts to balance the need to incentive inventors while still being
able to safe guard against any possible anti-competitive provisions that might be in the contract.
iii. How Technology and the Economy has changed since the Brulotte decision
Having a monopoly on a technological innovation is implausible considering how
quickly information spreads on the Internet.142 Innovations in communication and the Internet
now allow information to spread without restrictions more rapidly than anyone could have
predicted.143 In additionally, all patent information is accessible through the United States

140

Id.
Id.
142
Heather Leonard, The Fascinating Spread Of Content Through Social Networks,
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-content-spreads-on-social-media-2013-4.
143
Id.
141

22

patents website.144 There is even a search function that allows you to quickly find the patent or
type of patent that you are looking for.145 This significantly cuts against the stated justification
that extending royalty agreements would incentivize parties to hide away inventions and
innovations. Even if a corporation or inventor wanted to keep their patent secret from the world
and monopolize the innovation it would be impossible. Not only are all patents available for
viewing, on the United States patent website, the prevalence of social media and Internet
communications allows for a fast and wide dissemination of information146
It is also important to consider how the parties have changed since Brulotte the case
involved two farmers who had no legal or business experience.147 In Kimble, Marvel is the party
who made the agreement to use the patent.148 A large and sophisticated corporation already has
an advantage in the bargaining process and the Court has increased that power.149 In Brulotte,
there was real possibility that if the royalty agreement could continue for a longer period of time
there would be an unfair monopoly on the patented information.150 This is no longer the case as
even farmers who live far from a metropolitan center have the same access to information via the
Internet.151
The dissent addressed the fact that there is no reasonable way that the extension of a
patent could keep that patent from the public.
The Supreme Court's majority opinion reasoned that by extracting a
promise to continue paying royalties after expiration of the patent,
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the patentee extends the patent beyond the term fixed in the patent
statute and therefore in violation of the law. That is not true. After
the patent expires, anyone can make the patented process or product
without being guilty of patent infringement. The patent can no
longer be used to exclude anybody from such production. Expiration
thus accomplishes what it is supposed to accomplish. For a licensee
in accordance with a provision in the license agreement to go on
paying royalties after the patent expires does not extend the duration
of the patent either technically or practically.152

iv. A long royalty period might be in the best interest of all of the parties
As the dissent in Kimble stated the economic reasoning behind allowing parties to
contract past the expiration date is quite simple.153 The ability to spread out the royalty
agreement allows the company purchasing the rights to patent to put up less money up front and
reduce its risks.154 Speaking on the Kimble decision, Joshua Kennon, a business investor and
author of several prominent books, stated “cash flows cannot be valued as a perpetuity.”155 This
speaks to the potentially difficulties an inventor may have in reaching an agreement that is
economically viable for parties. It also addresses the inherit difficulties in structuring a long-term
royalty agreement. He went on to state that “[t]he court just reiterated that a major negotiation
tool remains out of your toolbox, even if both parties agree to it in a free market transaction.”156
The current state of the law will require a substantial increase in the upfront payment, or the
royalty rate itself.157 There could by many situations where this rigid cash structure could make a
deal unworkable. If the party paying the royalties cannot afford a high yearly percentage they are
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left without any options. That would mean even if the transaction would be beneficial for both
parties with an extension on the royalty agreement the deal will not go through.
For example, I want to make a royalty agreement but cannot afford to pay more than 3%
royalty per year. If the inventor requires more money for his /her invention than the 3%, it may
be in the interest of both parties to extend that agreement. If that point in which extending the
agreement at 3% becomes economically viable for both parties is after the expiration of the
patent than the deal may be unworkable.
The Court in Scheiber stated, “If the licensee agrees to continue paying royalties after the
patent expires the royalty rate will be lower. The duration of the patent fixes the limit of the
patentee's power to extract royalties; it is a detail whether he extracts them at a higher rate over a
shorter period of time.”158
The majority has taken a critically important bargaining chip off the table for both parties
in a patent royalty agreement.159 As a result of the Kimble decision there are many potential
deals that could have served both parties and the public in general that will never come to
fruition.
F. The Court overly relies on the possibility that Congress can overturn the case
The dissent properly points out that the majority has placed too much trust in Congress
and has not properly considered the realities of the current political climate.160 Speaking on this
matter the dissent stated: “The Court also places too much weight on Congress’ failure to
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overturn Brulotte. We have long cautioned that ‘[i]t is at best treacherous to find in
congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.’”161
The mere fact that Congress considers enacting new legislation, that would over turn a
judicial decision, but does not enact that legislation should not be interpreted to mean that
Congress approves of that decision.162 Even where Congress has considered, but not adopted,
legislation that would abrogate a judicial ruling, it cannot be inferred that Congress’ failure to act
shows that it approves the ruling.163 To take this view would severely simplify the complicated
nature of political dealings within Congress. “A federal statute must withstand the ‘finely
wrought’ procedure of bicameralism and presentment.”164 Even if the proposed law can be
agreed upon by both parties it still has to be brought up for discussion and not passed over in
favor legislation that is more important. Additionally Senate rules require sixty votes to end
debate on most legislation.165 With the countless pressing matters that Congress must attend to
and the friction between our two main political parties, to interpret Congressional silence as
acceptance would be a grave mistake. Considering also the small number of people that are
effect by the decision in Brulotte that was upheld by Kimble its no wonder Congress has never
got around to addressing the matter.

161

Id.
Id.; Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 187 (1994).
163
Id.
164
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
165
Kimble v. Marvel Entm't, LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2418 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
162

26

G. Gridlock in Congress
The political climate in America makes it difficult for even the most mundane laws to
pass through Congress.166 Bills are not being considered on their merits, but instead on value to
certain political agendas. Congressional silence can in no way be considered tacit approval of the
ruling in Brulotte.167
The political parties in Congress are more willing to shut down the government than to
cross-political lines.168 Despite fact that congressional gridlock has been shown to be objectively
harmful to the United States economy it does not seem the standstill will be ending any time in
the near future.169 This means that even though overruling Brulotte would be good for the
United States economy, the legislation may never come to fruition because of political divides
and ineffectiveness in Congress.170
The problems with bipartisanship has led to a less efficient Congress that not only has
problems considering legislation, but is also working less.171 The House of Representatives
worked ninety-five days in 2015, compared to 1995 in which The House worked one-hundred
and twelve days.172 The Senate worked one-hundred and eighteen days in 2015 and ninety-nine
in 2013 compared to one-hundred and fifty-one in 1995.173 Although Brulotte is an old decision,
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it has not been widely reexamined until recently. Even when Congress is properly functioning it
would be incorrect to take Congressional silence as tacit approval.174
Part IV. Conclusion
The majority in Kimble has given unnecessary superpowers to stare decisis that has
allowed an incorrect ruling to stand. The Court places far too much weight on Congressional
silence. At the end of the day, the matter is judge made law and for there to be any progression
in the field it must be judge made change.
The Court underestimated the importance of the freedom to contract in an otherwise
perfectly legal and acceptable contract. There are obvious reasons why the freedom to contract
is not absolute, but nothing that typically makes a contract unenforceable (coercion, illegality…)
is present in this case.
The court is dis-incentivizing invention and has created a rule of law that will upset
party’s reasonable expectations. A rule of reason that addresses the facts of each individual case
would have better served party’s interests and better served justice. The success that the rule of
reason has had in antitrust cases shows how it would be successful in this matter (which the
dissent points out is really an antitrust case).175
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